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ESSAY 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN RACE 
EQUALITY LAW: CHEZ RAZPREDELENIE 
BULGARIA AD V. KOMISIA ZA ZASHTITA OT 
DISKRIMINATSIA, ANELIA NIKOLOVA 
Julie C. Suk* 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “The 
Court”) has decided very few cases construing the scope of racial or 
ethnic discrimination. The cases that have provided opportunities to 
define discrimination and the frameworks for proving it have largely 
arisen in the context of Equal Treatment case law prior to the 
antidiscrimination directives of 2000,1 and subsequently, in age 
discrimination decisions construing Directive 2000/78/EC.2 Despite 
continued political contestation around ethnic, racial, and/or religious 
discrimination against Roma and Arab and North African Muslims in 
various member states, few discrimination cases challenging such 
discrimination have been referred to the CJEU.3 Nonetheless, in recent 
years, a handful of decisions suggest the Court’s willingness to define 
ethnic and racial discrimination under EU law in innovative and far-
reaching directions.4 
                                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
1.  See Regina v. Sec’y of State for Emp’t, ex parte Seymour-Smith and Perez, Case C-
167/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-666; Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth. and Sec’y of State for Health, 
Case C-127/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-5535; Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., Case 96/80, 
[1981] E.C.R. 912. 
2.  See, e.g., Incorporated Trs. of the Nat’l Council for Ageing (Age Concern England) v. 
Sec’y of State for Bus., Enter., and Regulatory Reform, Case C-388/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1569. 
3.  See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Annexes to the 
Joint Report on the Application of Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) and the Employment 
Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), SWD (2014) 5 Final (Jan. 17, 2014), Annex II (noting that 
case-law on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin is less developed). 
4.  See CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, and 
Anelia Nikolava, and Darzhavna Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane, Case C-83/14, 2015, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=165912&doclang=EN; Belov v. 
CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD, Case C-394/11, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62011CJ0394; Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale 
della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES), Case C-571/10, 2012, http://eur-
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This Essay identifies the Court’s antidiscrimination innovations 
in its July 2015 decision, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v. Komisia 
za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, Anelia Nikolova (“CHEZ”). In a decision 
addressing discrimination against Roma in the provision of public 
services, the CJEU put forth an expansive definition of indirect 
discrimination. The decision, in recognizing a non-Roma plaintiff as a 
proper party to complain of discrimination against Roma, also 
innovates with regard to standing to enforce EU antidiscrimination 
norms. Both the articulation of the indirect discrimination framework 
in the direction of scrutinizing the defendant’s justifications, as well as 
the expansion of standing to enforce antidiscrimination norms, are 
justified by reference to the Directive’s stated purposes. The 
prohibition of race discrimination in employment aims not merely to 
provide remedies to individuals who are humiliated, but to bring about 
democratic and tolerant societies that operate with an ethos of 
inclusion. 
CHEZ was referred to the CJEU by the Administrativen sad Sofia-
grad, a Bulgarian administrative court that had affirmed a decision 
against it by the Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia (“KZD”), the 
Commission for Protection Against Discrimination. The proceedings 
had been initiated by Ms. Nikolova, an operator of a grocery store in a 
predominantly Roma neighborhood. Nikolova is not herself of Roma 
origin, but she lodged a complaint with the KZD against CHEZ, 
claiming anti-Roma discrimination. CHEZ, an electrical power 
provider, installed electricity meters for all consumers in the district 
encompassing Nikolova’s store at a height of six to seven meters. In 
other districts, CHEZ installed electricity meters at a height of 1.7 
meters. Because the electricity meters were too high for Nikolova to 
read, she was unable to monitor her consumption and unable to confirm 
whether CHEZ was overcharging her for consumption on her invoices. 
In ruling on her complaint, KZD determined that CHEZ’s practice of 
placing the electricity meters at six or seven meters in Nikolova’s 
neighborhood constituted indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality under a Bulgarian statute that had implemented Directive 
2000/43/EC. 
                                                                                                                                     
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62010CJ0571; Meister v. Speech 
Design Carrier Sys. GmbH, Case C-415/10, 2012, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?docid=121741&doclang=EN; Runevič-Vardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės 
administracija, Case C-391/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-3787; Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en 
voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-5187. 
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An administrative court annulled the KZD’s decision, because 
Nikolova was a Bulgarian national, and therefore could not claim 
nationality discrimination based on the experience of Roma persons, 
many of whom may have also held Bulgarian nationality. On remand, 
KZD concluded that Nikolova had been directly discriminated against, 
on grounds of her “personal situation.” Under the Bulgarian 
antidiscrimination statute implementing the EU race directive, 
“personal situation” is a prohibited ground of discrimination. KZD, 
without referencing race or ethnicity, concluded that Nikolova was 
discriminated against based on the location of her business, by 
comparison to CHEZ’s customers in other locations whose meters were 
placed at an accessible height. CHEZ sought judicial review of KZD’s 
decision in the Administrative Court of Sofia. The administrative court 
referred ten questions concerning various provisions of Directive 
2000/43/EC to the CJEU. 
The referred questions took up issues that had previously been 
raised and discussed in the Belov litigation before the CJEU a few years 
earlier.5 In Belov, a Roma resident of a predominantly Roma district in 
Bulgaria had challenged the same practice of placing electricity meters 
at six or seven meters, carried out by a different electric power 
company. There, the KZD had concluded that the practice was 
discriminatory in violation of the Bulgarian statute implementing 
Directive 2000/43/EC, and referred several questions regarding the 
construction of direct and indirect discrimination, as well as the 
compatibility of some provisions of the Bulgarian statute with EU law, 
to the CJEU. In Belov, contrary to Advocate General Kokott’s opinion,6 
the CJEU deemed the case inadmissible, on the grounds that KZD, the 
administrative agency tasked with enforcing antidiscrimination law, 
was not a court or tribunal and therefore incompetent to refer questions 
to the CJEU.7 In CHEZ, by contrast, it was the administrative courts, 
not the antidiscrimination agency, that referred the same questions to 
the CJEU. 
Several of the questions were clustered around the problem of 
defining “ethnic origin” for the purposes of enforcing an 
antidiscrimination norm. Ms. Nikolova, the complainant here, never 
claimed to be of Roma origin, but she sought a remedy for an injury 
that she characterized as a form of anti-Roma discrimination. Is it 
                                                                                                                                     
5.  See Belov, C-394/11. 
6.  See generally Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Belov, C-394/11. 
7.  See Belov, C-394/11, ¶ 51. 
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coherent for antidiscrimination law to treat such a person as a victim of 
ethnic discrimination, to recognize her standing to enforce an 
antidiscrimination norm, to conceptualize the injury she complained of 
as ethnic discrimination? Doctrinally, the fundamental philosophical 
puzzle as to whether a non-Roma person could be a victim of 
discrimination against Roma focused not only on the definition of 
“ethnic origin,” but also on whether the six to seven meter height of 
electric meters required comparison to the height of electric meters in 
other districts to state a claim of discrimination, and the nexus of any 
disadvantage stemming from the greater height of the electric meters 
to ethnic origin.8  
It is by no means obvious that a court enforcing, construing, and 
interpreting a prohibition of discrimination should recognize a 
nonmember of a disadvantaged ethnic group as a victim of 
discrimination against that group. Consider, for example, a US court’s 
approach to an analogous situation. White male police officers brought 
a lawsuit complaining about a racially and sexually hostile work 
environment when their white male supervisor harassed their black and 
female co-workers and made racist and misogynistic remarks. Even 
though the white male plaintiffs were not the targets of this 
discrimination, they claimed that the racist and sexist work 
environment injured their ability to perform their jobs together with 
black and female co-workers. The Fourth Circuit held that the male 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim of sex discrimination, and refused 
to recognize their alleged injury as sex discrimination for which they 
would have standing to complain.9 At the same time, the US Supreme 
Court, in the context of interpreting the antidiscrimination mandate of 
the federal fair housing statute a quarter century earlier, allowed white 
tenants to sue under the statute to challenge their landlord’s exclusion 
of black rental applicants. The white tenants claimed that they were 
harmed by discrimination against black rental applicants because they 
were deprived of the social benefits of living in an integrated 
community.10 These different approaches over the last several decades 
in the United States suggest that it is a difficult and controversial 
question as to whether a non-member of an ethnic or racial group 
                                                                                                                                     
8.  See Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad 
(Bulgaria) lodged on 17 February 2014, CHEZ, C-83/14, Questions 1-4; see also CHEZ, C-
83/14, ¶ 37. 
9.  See Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1998). 
10.  See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206-07 (1972). 
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should be recognized as a party injured by discrimination against that 
ethnic or racial group. 
Of course, it has always been a fixed feature of antidiscrimination 
law since the latter half of the twentieth century that antidiscrimination 
laws are written in race-neutral terms. Antidiscrimination laws protect 
everyone, not only members of oppressed minority races or ethnicities, 
from race-based discrimination, just as sex discrimination law protects 
both men and women from sex-based discrimination. This is why, from 
the beginning, whites have been able to invoke legal nondiscrimination 
norms to challenge race-based affirmative action programs, claiming 
what is sometimes known as “reverse” discrimination.11 Similarly, men 
invoke legal nondiscrimination norms to challenge laws that favor 
mothers rather than fathers and wives rather than husbands, in the 
context of family or social benefits policy.12 Yet, when Ms. Nikolova, 
a non-Roma Bulgarian claimed that she was injured by discrimination 
on grounds of ethnicity in the circumstances of this case, the structure 
of her claim is quite different from a claim of “reverse” discrimination. 
She is not saying that a policy that works to the advantage of an ethnic 
minority is working to her disadvantage. She is claiming, to the 
contrary, that a policy that works to the disadvantage of a minority to 
which she does not belong also works to her disadvantage. As the CJEU 
puts it, Ms. Nikolova “suffer[s] together” 13 with her Roma neighbors 
when they are subject to discrimination on grounds of ethnicity. 
In justifying the conclusion that Ms. Nikolova is a proper 
complainant, the CJEU painted in broad brushstrokes the “fundamental 
principles” underlying its approach. It points to recitals in the preamble 
of the race directive that articulate the ambitious social goals of the 
directive, to justify a generally expansive approach.14 It states: 
As the Court has already held in the light of the objective of 
Directive 2000/43 and the nature of the rights which it seeks to 
safeguard, and in view of the fact that that directive is merely an 
expression, within the area under consideration, of the principle of 
equality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, as 
                                                                                                                                     
11.  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293-300 (1978). 
12.  For United States examples, see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S 636 (1975); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Men have also invoked antidiscrimination norms 
to challenge special protections for mothers before the CJEU. See Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start 
España ETT SA, Case C-104/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-8661; Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, Case 
184/83, [1984] E.C.R. 3047. 
13.  CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 60. 
14.  Id. ¶ 40. 
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recognized in Article 21 of the Charter, the scope of that directive 
cannot be defined restrictively.15 
Thus, the Court urges that the prohibition of discrimination, read 
in conjunction with Article 21 of the Charter, “must be interpreted as 
being intended to apply in circumstances such as those at issue in the 
main proceedings irrespective of whether the measure at issue in those 
proceedings affects persons who have a certain ethnic origin or persons 
who, without possessing that origin, suffer, together with the former, 
the less favourable treatment or particular disadvantage resulting from 
that measure.”16 
The Court invokes the notion, frequently associated with 
justifying challenges to positive action, that Directive 2000/43 is 
concerned not with groups, but with grounds for discrimination: “the 
principle of equal treatment to which that directive refers applies not to 
a particular category of person but by reference to the grounds . . . so 
that that principle is intended to benefit also persons who, although not 
themselves a member of the race or ethnic group concerned, 
nevertheless suffer less favorable treatment or a particular disadvantage 
on one of those grounds.”17 The Court notes, citing recital 16 of the 
preamble to the directive, that “the protection against discrimination on 
grounds of racial or ethnic origin which the directive is designed to 
guarantee is to benefit ‘all’ persons.”18 
The Court justifies this expansive approach on the understanding 
that the race discrimination directive is “intended to ensure the 
development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the 
participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, and it 
is to this end that ‘any’ direct or indirect discrimination based on racial 
or ethnic origin as regards the areas covered by the directive should be 
prohibited throughout the European Union.”19 Non-discrimination is a 
principle that promotes a democracy in which persons of various 
origins participate together. The court’s decision enables persons 
belonging to majority ethnicities to challenge discriminatory practices 
against ethnic minorities when they suffer the discriminatory practice 
together. Instead of pitting majority against minority, 
                                                                                                                                     
15.  Id. ¶ 43 (citations omitted). 
16.  Id. ¶ 50. 
17.  Id. ¶ 56. 
18.  Id. ¶ 57. 
19.  Id. ¶ 65. 
2017] EUROPEAN RACE EQUALITY LAW 1217 
antidiscrimination law can be made to promote solidarity and 
integration in democratic participation. 
The idea that nonmembers of the disadvantaged group can suffer 
together is also acknowledged in the CJEU’s decision in Coleman v. 
Attridge Law. In that case, referred by a London Employment Tribunal, 
the claimant alleged that she was subject to adverse treatment by her 
employer because she was the primary carer of a disabled child.20 The 
Court held that Directive 2000/78, which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of disability, was not limited only to people who are 
themselves disabled. The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
disability covered a worker who was the primary carer of a disabled 
child, due to the purpose of the directive to combat all forms of 
disability discrimination.21 
The theory of diverse democracy underlying the Court’s 
recognition of Ms. Nikolova as a proper complainant also animates the 
Court’s skepticism of the relationship between non-discrimination 
principles and rights. Here, CHEZ had claimed that its practice of 
placing much taller electrical meters in this predominantly Roma 
district could not possibly amount to discrimination because there 
existed no substantive individual right to electrical meters of any 
particular height. The Bulgarian statute implementing the race directive 
had stipulated that “unfavourable treatment” constituting direct or 
indirect discrimination was “any act, action, or omission which directly 
or indirectly prejudices rights or legitimate interests.”22 If no person has 
a right or legitimate interest to begin with in electrical meters at an 
accessible height, CHEZ’s provision of short meters in some districts 
and tall meters in other districts has no effect on any rights or legitimate 
interests and would not register as “unfavorable treatment.” The 
structure of this argument is that, when a decision-maker has discretion 
(for example, an employer who employs all employees “at will”), it 
makes little sense to say that the person has discriminated when he is 
exercising the discretion that the law gives him. The Court took the 
view, however, that “unfavourable treatment” under the directive did 
not require any negative effect on a legitimate interest or right. Rather, 
“unfavorable treatment” could include any adverse treatment, even of 
a minimally serious nature.23 What matters is that there is treatment that 
                                                                                                                                     
20.  See Coleman v. Attridge Law, Case C-303/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-5603. 
21.  Id. ¶ 38. 
22.  CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 14. 
23.  See id. ¶¶ 65-67. 
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is “unfavorable” compared to another identifiable person who is not 
subject to that adverse treatment or effect. 
The Court goes so far as to suggest that, in defining “unfavourable 
treatment” as an injury to an existing right or legitimate interest, the 
Bulgarian statute is in conflict with the directive.24 The directive 
precludes a national provision that makes a prejudice to rights a 
necessary condition of a finding of direct or indirect discrimination. In 
so pronouncing, the Court is essentially suggesting that coherent, 
legally actionable discrimination could occur even without a significant 
harm to any particular person’s rights. The main problem of 
discrimination as a subject for EU law is not the harm to any 
individual’s rights or legitimate interests, but rather, the undermining 
of democratic and tolerant societies based on participation on equal 
terms. To limit discrimination to prejudice to rights or legitimate 
interests would be to define the scope of protection guaranteed by the 
directive “restrictively.”25 
This approach is consistent with the Court’s prior decisions, 
which recognize the possibility of victimless discrimination. In the case 
of Firma Feryn, decided in 2008, the CJEU determined that employers 
could be held liable for discriminating if they made racially 
exclusionary announcements with regard to their intention not to hire 
members of certain ethnic groups, even in the absence of a concrete 
person complaining about their rejection in a hiring process.26 The 
Court embraced the fundamental goals of the Directive: “The objective 
of fostering conditions for a socially inclusive labour market would be 
hard to achieve if the scope of Directive 2000/43 were to be limited to 
only those cases in which an unsuccessful candidate for a post, 
considering himself to be the victim of direct discrimination, brought 
legal proceedings against the employer.”27 
As this statement from Firma Feryn illustrates, this normative 
outlook informs the Court’s approach to how the norms should be 
enforced. In CHEZ, bold doctrinal innovations emerge with regard to 
the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination to enforce and 
promote a socially inclusive labor market. In introducing the doctrinal 
framework, the Court again emphasizes how the principle of non-
discrimination furthers the goals of the European Union: 
                                                                                                                                     
24.  Id. ¶ 68. 
25.  Id. ¶¶ 66-68. 
26.  Firma Feryn, [2008] E.C.R. I-5187, ¶ 25. 
27.  Id. ¶ 24. 
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[A]s is apparent from recitals 9, 12, and 13 in the preamble to 
Directive 2000/43, the EU legislature also sought to make clear (i) 
that discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin may undermine 
the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty, in particular the 
attainment of a high level of employment and of social protection, 
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, economic 
and social cohesion and solidarity, and may also undermine the 
objective of developing the European Union as an area of freedom, 
security, and justice and (ii) that the prohibition of any 
discrimination of that type which the directive imposes as regards 
the areas covered by it is intended, in particular, to ensure the 
development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the 
participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.28 
With the understanding that discrimination on grounds of race or 
ethnic origin undermines the shared EU social policies, including 
employment, social protection, solidarity, and inclusive democratic 
participation, the Court sets out the proof framework by which direct 
and indirect discrimination can be established in litigation. 
The starting point is Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/43, which 
provides for the shifting of the burden of proof once a complainant has 
established facts from which discrimination can be inferred. On the one 
hand, the Court’s jurisprudence has authorized national courts and 
other bodies to determine the facts from which discrimination may be 
inferred. On the other hand, in this decision, the Court explicitly 
determines that indirect discrimination can be inferred as an initial 
matter from the facts presented in this case, thereby requiring the 
respondent to articulate justifications for the practices that are being 
challenged as indirectly discriminatory. 
In this case, the referring court asked for guidance on what 
constituted an “apparently neutral practice” within the meaning of 
Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive. That article defines indirect 
discrimination as an “apparently neutral provision, criterion, or 
practice” that “would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that 
provision, criterion, or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.” In this case, the respondent suggested that the practice of 
placing the electricity meters at a height of six or seven meters was not 
an “apparently neutral . . . practice” that put Roma persons at a 
                                                                                                                                     
28.  Id. ¶ 74. 
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particular disadvantage. The reasoning behind this position is that, if it 
is alleged that the practice is directly discriminatory against the Roma, 
as it was here, that practice is not “apparently” neutral; it is only 
allegedly or “ostensibly” neutral. Under this approach, a practice that 
could plausibly be directly discriminatory (i.e. motivated by pernicious 
ethnic stereotypes of Roma as criminals stealing electricity) should not 
be analyzed under the “indirect discrimination” provision of Article 
2(2)(b) because its neutrality is not “apparent.” Without explicit 
discussion or justification, the Court rejects this construction of 
“apparently neutral,” referencing Advocate General Kokott’s 
explanation in her opinion. As Kokott explained: 
The term “apparently” in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 can 
only be interpreted as referring to an ostensibly or prima facie 
neutral provision, criterion, or practice. On the other hand, that 
term cannot simply mean that the provision, criterion or practice 
in question must be manifestly neutral, as the referring court seems 
to think. This would have the highly illogical consequence that no 
finding of discrimination could be made wherever the provision, 
criterion, or practice in question transpires to be “less neutral” than 
it may appear at first sight. This would possibly create a gap in the 
protection against discrimination which cannot under any 
circumstances be intended.29 
If “apparently” in Article 2(2)(b) were construed to mean 
“manifestly,” the gap in protection against discrimination imagined by 
Kokott would consist of the mutual exclusivity between direct and 
indirect theories of discrimination for any set of facts. In the instant 
case, a complainant would have to choose between arguing that the 
meters were installed at an inaccessible height because of hostile ethnic 
stereotypes of the Roma and arguing that the meters’ height put Roma 
persons at a disadvantage that could not be justified by reference to the 
proportionate pursuit of a legitimate purpose. 
The Court breaks down the analysis in the following way: if a 
measure gives rise to a difference in treatment that has been introduced 
for reasons relating to racial or ethnic origin, that measure must be 
classified as “direct discrimination” under Article 2(2)(a). If a measure 
uses “neutral criteria not based on the protected characteristic,” and “it 
has the effect of placing particularly persons possessing that 
characteristic at a disadvantage,” it may constitute indirect 
                                                                                                                                     
29.  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 92. 
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discrimination. “Neutral” cannot mean “nondiscriminatory;” it simply 
means not openly based on or obviously motivated by the protected 
characteristics of the persons involved. Such “neutral” practices still 
constitute “discrimination” when they do not meet the justification 
required under Article 2(2)(b). 
The Bulgarian statute, by contrast, in effect treated indirect 
discrimination no differently from direct discrimination. Although the 
statute prohibited indirect discrimination in language similar to that of 
Article 2(2)(b) of the directive, it read as follows: 
Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where, on the basis 
of characteristics mentioned in paragraph 1, one person is placed 
in a less favourable position compared with other persons by an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice, unless that 
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified having 
regard to a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary.30 
The key difference between the Bulgarian statutory prohibition 
and the Directive’s definition of indirect discrimination is that the 
Bulgarian statute imagines indirect discrimination as occurring “on the 
basis of” the protected characteristics. Supplementary provisions to the 
statute attempted to define the language, “on the basis of characteristics 
mentioned.” Point 8 noted, “‘on the basis of characteristics mentioned 
in Article 4(1)’ means: on the basis of the actual—present or past—or 
the presumed existence of one or more such characteristics possessed 
by the person discriminated against or a person connected with or 
assumed to be connected with that person, if such connection is the 
basis for the discrimination.”31 
This language led the Bulgarian administrative court to conclude 
that indirect discrimination could only occur under the statute if the 
“apparently neutral provision” caused disadvantage “on the basis of” 
ethnic origin. On this interpretation, the “apparently neutral” practice 
of installing electricity meters that were six to seven meters high would 
only trigger indirect discrimination analysis if the practice caused 
disadvantage “on the basis of” Roma ethnic origin. To say that an 
apparently neutral provision causes disadvantage “on the basis of” 
ethnic origin imports the direct discrimination framework into the 
                                                                                                                                     
30.  CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 13 (quoting Article 4 of the Law on protection against 
discrimination (Zakon za zashtita ot diskriminatsia; “the ZZD”)). 
31.  Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Point 8 of Paragraph 1 of the Supplementary Provisions of the ZZD). 
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construction of indirect discrimination. Indeed, the core of the indirect 
discrimination concept is precisely that it can be established with no 
direct or conscious targeting of the protected characteristics. Thus, 
CJEU notes that the Bulgarian provision goes against the Directive by 
defining indirect discrimination in such a manner that “the measure in 
question is required to have been adopted for reasons of racial or ethnic 
origin.”32 
In addition, the Court rejected the suggestion that the “particular 
disadvantage” caused by the apparently neutral practice had to be a 
serious, obvious, or particularly significant case of inequality in order 
to be cognizable under an indirect discrimination theory. The words 
“particular disadvantage” do not necessitate any particular degree of 
seriousness. Rather, the facts from which indirect discrimination can 
be inferred simply require a specific disadvantage resulting from the 
apparently neutral practice. 
Finally, the Court’s clarification of proportionality analysis in 
evaluating a respondent’s justification for the apparently neutral 
provision suggests an extremely stringent approach to potential 
justifications put forth by alleged discriminators in response to the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Instead of rejecting CHEZ’s justification 
as illegitimate, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of CHEZ’s 
purported aim of ensuring the security of the electricity transmission 
network, and left it to the national court to determine whether CHEZ 
could raise the height of electricity meters in areas where it deemed 
fraud or damage to be more likely in pursuit of this legitimate aim. 
Nonetheless, CJEU’s guidance to national courts makes it extremely 
difficult to conclude that this particular method is appropriate or 
necessary in achieving the aim of ensuring security. The Court first 
raises doubts about the nexus between this legitimate aim and the 
practice at issue in this case, namely placing the meters at an 
inaccessible height in certain districts that happened to be heavily 
populated by Roma. CHEZ did not produce any evidence, but rather 
claimed it was “common knowledge,” that there were numerous 
instances of damage and unlawful connections to electricity meters in 
those districts. The Court declared, “In order to discharge the burden 
of proof borne by it in this regard, CHEZ RB cannot merely contend 
that such conduct and risks are ‘common knowledge’, as it seems to 
                                                                                                                                     
32.  Id. ¶ 97. 
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have done before the referring court.”33 Thus, even when a 
discrimination defendant can name a legitimate aim in the abstract in 
response to the prima facie case of indirect discrimination, that 
defendant must still prove with evidence that the legitimate aim is one 
that is worth pursuing in the specific context. Here, it means that CHEZ 
has to show that there was a real problem with regard to property 
damage and unlawful connections in those districts. 
Furthermore, even if CHEZ is able to establish with evidence that 
there was real likelihood of unlawful activity on the electricity meters 
in these districts, additional elements of the burden of proof remain. 
The defendant must prove not only that the legitimate aim is in need of 
pursuit in this case, but also that the method chosen (placing meters at 
excessively high inaccessible height) is the least restrictive means of 
pursuing that aim.34 Here, the Court points to the fact that other 
electricity distribution companies have combated damage and 
tampering by utilizing new technologies which can monitor instances 
of tampering.35 Thus, incorporating new technologies that use 
surveillance rather than deterrence seems less restrictive, although 
perhaps more costly, and the ultimate determination was left to the 
national court. 
In this proportionality analysis of whether the means chosen is 
necessary and appropriate to achieve the legitimate aim, CJEU instructs 
the national court not only to consider the costs and benefits of the 
allegedly less restrictive methods of pursuing the legitimate aim; 
national courts are also to consider the interests of the people inhabiting 
the district. It is interesting to see this consideration pop up at this stage 
of the analysis; one could argue that the prima facie case, wherein the 
disadvantaging effect of an apparently neutral practice is established, 
already speaks to the interests of those disadvantaged. Nonetheless, the 
Court notes that the “disadvantages caused by the practice appear 
disproportionate to the objectives pursued.” The disadvantages include 
not only the inability of the consumer to check and monitor their own 
electricity consumption—a problem which not only affects Nikolova 
herself, but also the stigma experienced by those who are 
disadvantaged because of their Roma ethnicity. The stigma is not 
something that Nikolova could be said to experience; nonetheless it 
seems to be doing a lot of work in making the proportionality analysis 
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lean towards a finding of indirect discrimination. The referring court is 
encouraged to consider the extent to which the practice being 
challenged “prejudices excessively the legitimate interest of the final 
consumers of electricity inhabiting . . . the district concerned, mainly 
lived in by inhabitants of Roma origin, in having access to the supply 
of electricity in conditions which are not of an offensive or stigmatizing 
nature and which enable them to monitor their electricity consumption 
regularly.”36 
CONCLUSION 
CHEZ is an extension of the CJEU’s project of re-conceptualizing 
discrimination and what makes it wrong. By diminishing the role of 
concrete injuries in creating opportunities for norm articulation by 
courts, CJEU also reaffirms why norms against discrimination are 
important to the European project. By recognizing the standing of a 
non-Roma person to challenge ethnic discrimination against the Roma, 
and by refining the indirect discrimination analysis, the Court reaffirms 
the maintenance of democratic and tolerant societies as a goal of 
Directive 2000/43 and the European Union itself. 
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